Timmons v. Ingraham, — So.3d —-, 2010 WL 2217637 (Fla. 5th DCA Jun 04, 2010)
As reported here by the WSJ, “When it comes to blended families, estate planning can be a special kind of hell.” A corollary to that observation: blended families are always at risk for probate litigation. Yes, I said always! This case is an example of the type of probate litigation blended families can find themselves in and why these cases need to be treated like ticking time bombs both at the estate-planning phase and in the probate context.
Blended Family Red Flag: Stepmother as Beneficiary of Dad’s Marital Trust = Estate Planning Trouble:
In 1999 “Frank Sr.” died married to “Myrtle”. Frank Sr. had two adopted children from a prior marriage, and Myrtle had four children of her own, whom Frank Sr. had never adopted. Frank Sr’s will provided that at his death all assets would go in trust for Myrtle for life, and at her death everything would go to the couple’s six children in equal shares. Frank Sr’s will also gave Myrtle a “power of appointment” that could be exercised only in favor of his “descendants.” Simple plan; the sort of thing traditional families put in place every day and no one ever contests. But this was a blended family, which means things are never simple.
Fast forward to 2007: Stepmother Myrtle is now attempting to use her power of appointment to disinherit her stepchildren (Frank Sr’s two adopted children) in favor of her own four children. Think about these facts: we’re not talking about Myrtle’s personal assets here, this case is about Myrtle’s attempt to give 100% of her former husband’s estate to her children and 0% to Frank Sr’s children. Yeah, not exactly a pretty picture.
Legal Definition: Stepchildren ≠ Descendants
The technical issue at play in this case was whether the term “descendants” should be interpreted or “construed” to include Frank Jr’s stepchildren, thus allowing Myrtle to disinherit Frank Sr’s children. Myrtle won at the trial court level, but lost on appeal. Here’s how the 5th DCA explained its ruling:
In determining the intent of the settlor, a technical term used in a trust instrument should be accorded its legal definition, unless obviously used by the settlor in a different sense. Knauer v. Barnett, 360 So.2d 399, 406 (Fla.1978). “Lineal descendant” or “descendant” is defined to mean “a person in any generational level down the applicable individual’s descending line.” It includes children, grandchildren, or more remote descendants but excludes collateral heirs. § 731.201(9), Fla. Stat. (2007). Adopted children come within the definition of lineal descendants. Lewis v. Green, 389 So.2d 235, 241 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
The co-trustees acknowledge that step-children do not ordinarily fall within the definition of “lineal descendants,” but contend that by expressly expanding the definition of “children” to include his step-children for purposes of his will, Frank Sr. similarly intended to expand the definition of “lineal descendants” to include his step-children and their descendants.” We reject this argument.
While Frank Sr.’s will expressly provided for a different definition of the term “children” than its common or legal definition, no similar attempt was made to modify the common or legal definition of the term “lineal descendants.” The lack of an attempt to redefine “lineal descendant” reflects an intent to have the term interpreted in accordance with its legal definition. Furthermore, Frank Sr. used the term “lineal descendants” on only two other occasions in his will. In one paragraph, Frank Sr. bequested his personal property, in the event Myrtle predeceased him, “to my children who survive me, or if none of my children survive me, then to their lineal descendants, per stirpes.” In a different paragraph, Frank Sr. bequested certain shares of stock “to my son Frank Timmons, Jr., or his lineal descendants per stirpes.” Thus, in both of these instances, the term “lineal descendants” was used in a manner consistent with its legal definition. Finally, there is no language elsewhere in the will reflecting an intent on the part of Frank Sr. to grant Myrtle the power to disinherit his children in favor of her own children.
As previously observed, a technical term used in a trust instrument should be accorded its legal definition unless obviously used by the settlor in a different sense. Knauer. Here, we believe that Frank Sr.’s testamentary document did not reflect an intent (and certainly not an “obvious” one) to expand the definition of lineal descendants to include step-children. Therefore, Myrtle’s purported exercise of the limited power of appointment in favor of her natural children was invalid.
There’s an obvious practice pointer here for estate planners: terms such as “children” and “descendants” are so crucial, they need to be defined in every will or trust. And if you’re working with a blended family, it’s imperative that you do so. Below is the standard form of “family” definitional clause used at my firm. This is the very first clause of every will and trust we draft.
I am married to MARY DOE, who is referred to as “my wife” in this Will. My wife and I are both citizens of the United States. My wife has been previously married and has two children from that marriage, CHILD 1 and CHILD 2, whom I have not adopted. References to “my wife’s children” mean only her children named above. I have been previously married and have two children from that marriage, ADULT CHILD #1 and ADULT CHILD #2. References to “my children” mean only my children named above, as well as any other children of mine born or adopted after the execution of this Will; references to “my descendants” mean my children and their descendants.
If Frank Sr’s will had had this kind of clause, tailored to reflect his exact wishes, this litigation could have probably been avoided.
Will and trust construction disputes are one of the most common forms of estate litigation, and – not surprisingly – a recurring theme on this blog. If you unpack the 5th DCA’s opinion, you get a good example of how to argue a will-construction case. It’s a convincing mix of law and logic, and certainly worth holding on to for the next time you find yourself litigating a similar case.
 5th DCA: When in doubt, technical terms must be used in accordance with their legal definitions.
In this case, Frank Sr’s will did NOT redefine the word “descendants”. Ergo: you have to apply the statutory definition (which includes adoptees, but excludes step-children).
 5th DCA: When in doubt, terms should be used consistently within the same document.
In this case the word “descendants” was used 3 times in Frank Sr’s will. Once in the clause being litigated, then an additional 2 times in unrelated clauses. In the 2 uncontested clauses, the word descendants was used in accordance with its legal definition. Ergo: the legal definition of descendants should also apply to the contested clause as well.
 5th DCA: Documents should be read in their entirety. When in doubt, terms should be used in a way that conforms with the rest of the estate plan.
In this case the 5th DCA noted: “[T]here is no language elsewhere in the will reflecting an intent on the part of Frank Sr. to grant Myrtle the power to disinherit his children in favor of her own children.” Ergo: the word descendants should NOT be construed in a way that disinherits Frank Sr’s children.