Phillips v. Hirshon, — So.2d —-, 2007 WL 1263475 (Fla. 3d DCA May 02, 2007)
Article X, section 4(c) of the Florida Constitution, which declares that “homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by a spouse or minor child,” is one of the few “forced heirship” rules applicable under Florida law (the only other example of significance would be Florida’s spousal elective share rules). These rules provide an opportunity to challenge a will that is exponentially easier than traditional grounds for challenging a will in Florida (see here).
Children challenge dad’s devise to girlfriend on homestead-law grounds
In this case dad devised a life estate in his Key Biscayne penthouse to his girlfriend. One of his two surviving sons was a minor, so they challenged this devise by arguing that the property was homestead property. Here’s how the 3d DCA summarized their argument:
After their father’s death, Joseph and David filed separate petitions to determine homestead. The thrust of their argument to the trial court was that the co-op was homestead property in the hands of their father at the time of his death and therefore not subject to devise by him under Article X, section 4(c) of the Florida Constitution, which declares that “homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by a spouse or minor child.” The brothers contend that because David was a minor, the bequest under the will fails and the property passes outside of the estate, and therefore, the brothers now share the father’s interest in the co-op on an equal basis as a matter of law.
3d DCA says NO to homestead status for co-op
The trial court didn’t buy this argument, and neither did the 3d DCA based on a conflicting Florida Supreme Court opinion. However, the 3d DCA made clear that it felt the sons should have prevailed, and took the extra step of certifiying the issue to the Florida Supreme Court for reconsideration. Here’s ow the 3d DCA summarized its holding:
The Levine brothers urge that because their father occupied the co-operative apartment under a long-term proprietary lease received in conjunction with his purchase of his interest in the co-op, the property is protected homestead property under Florida law. Applying the principle of stare decisis, we affirm the decision of the trial court on authority of In re Estate of Wartels v. Wartels, 357 So.2d 708 (Fla.1978), which expressly holds “that a cooperative apartment may not be considered homestead property for the purpose of subjecting it to Florida Statutes regulating the descent of homestead property.” Id. at 711 (construing Article X, section 4(a)(1), Fla. Const.). At the same time, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great public importance under Article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, whether its decision in Wartels has continuing vitality in light of subsequent legislative action. We also find certifiable, direct conflict between our decision today and the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in S. Walls, Inc. v. Stilwell Corp., 810 So.2d 566 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), which construed the same section of Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution upon which the Wartels court relied to deny the benefit of homestead to an heir in the devise and descent context of Article X, section 4(c) to nevertheless afford the benefit of homestead protection from a forced sale under Article X, sections 4(a) and 4(b) of the same constitutional provision.