4th DCA: When does a surviving spouse's "elective share" take an estate-tax hit?

Boulis v. Blackburn, --- So.3d ----, 2009 WL 2382358 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug 05, 2009)

The decedent at the heart of this probate battle, Konstantinos "Gus" Boulis, was a Greek immigrant and self-made millionaire who had started as a dishwasher in Canada and ended up in Florida, where he built an empire of restaurants, hotels and cruise ships used for offshore casino gambling. His 2001 gangland-style murder was allegedly linked to the $147.5 million sale of his company, SunCruz Casinos, to a partnership including disgraced Republican über lobbyist Jack Abramoff.

Apparently Boulis wasn't very fond of his wife: he completely cut her out of his estate. Lucky for her Boulis died a Florida resident, so she was able to claim a 30% share of his estate under F.S. § 732.201. That's the good news. The bad news is that she may have to fork over close to half of her share in estate taxes.

The Elephant in the Room: Estate Tax Allocation:

In large estates the elephant in the room is always: "who's going to pay the estate tax?" Considering that the top marginal estate tax rate is 45%, whose share of the estate gets used to pay this tax bill is a huge big deal. For example, if Boulis's widow was awarded a $10 million elective share, how the estate-tax allocation question is answered could mean the difference between her walking away with $10 million or $6.5 million!

Usually zero estate taxes are allocated to a widow's elective share because of the unlimited estate-tax marital deduction. However, Boulis's widow wasn't a U.S. citizen, so the normal rules don't apply. But even for non-citizens, it's pretty easy to avoid paying any estate tax by creating a qualified domestic trust or "QDOT" to hold the widow's share of the estate. For reasons not explained by the 4th DCA, this hasn't happened in this case.

Having failed to dodge the estate-tax bullet by relying on the federal tax code provisions governing QDOTs, Boulis's widow fell back on two state-level statutory-construction arguments involving F.S. 733.817, Florida's estate-tax allocation statute.

[1]  Is an elective share ever liable for estate taxes?

Because elective-share assets going to a surviving spouse almost never trigger any estate tax, F.S. 733.817 doesn't have a specific clause addressing those rare instances where a tax is triggered. Boulis's widow argued this omission means taxes are NEVER allocated to elective share assets. Wrong answer says the 4th DCA, here's why:

Appellant argues that certain probate code sections relieve her elective share of any liability for estate taxes. Section 733.817, Florida Statutes (2000), governs the apportionment of estate taxes. Subsections (5)(a), (5)(b), and (5)(c) apply to the apportionment of taxes on property passing under the decedent's will, property passing under the terms of any trust created in the decedent's will and homestead property, respectively.

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“The purpose of section 733.817 is to ensure that all estate and inheritance taxes are shared on a ratable basis by the beneficiaries receiving the property subject to those taxes.” Tarbox v. Palmer, 564 So.2d 1106, 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). As appellant is not entitled to the marital deduction on her elective share, then that elective share is subject to tax. The net tax on an elective share is not apportioned under paragraphs (5)(a), (5)(b), or (5)(c), and it is not otherwise excluded. Therefore, the net tax attributable to the elective share is apportionable under section 733.817(5)(f).

[2]  But what if the decedent waived the normal tax allocations rules?

Boulis's widow then argued that even if her share of the estate was taxable, her husband's will trumped application of the Florida tax allocation statute because it directed that the payment of taxes attributable to property NOT passing under his will (such as her elective share) must be paid from property passing under his will (read: tax everyone else but the widow). This allocation argument has a long and storied past here in Florida. Unfortunately for Boulis's widow, by now it's pretty well settled that the language in the will has to be extremely specific for this argument to work. In this case it wasn't, so she lost this argument as well.

In his will, the decedent “direct[s][his] Personal Representative to pay out of the property which would otherwise become a part of the Residuary Estate, all estate, inheritance, transfer and succession taxes, including interest and penalties thereon, which may be lawfully assessed by reason of my death.” Appellant argues that pursuant to section 733.817(5)(h)1., Florida Statutes (2000), this provision of the will directs appellees to pay the taxes on the elective share out of the residuary estate. The trial court held that section 733.817(5)(h)4., Florida Statutes, is the applicable provision and, under that section, the decedent has not effectively directed the payment of taxes attributable to property not passing under the governing instrument from property passing under the governing instrument.

Section 733.817(5)(h), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part:

(h)1. To be effective as a direction for payment of tax in a manner different from that provided in this section, the governing instrument must direct that the tax be paid from assets that pass pursuant to that governing instrument, except as provided in this section.

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4. For a direction in a governing instrument to be effective to direct payment of taxes attributable to property not passing under the governing instrument from property passing under the governing instrument, the governing instrument must expressly refer to this section, or expressly indicate that the property passing under the governing instrument is to bear the burden of taxation for property not passing under the governing instrument. A direction in the governing instrument to the effect that all taxes are to be paid from property passing under the governing instrument whether attributable to property passing under the governing instrument or otherwise shall be effective to direct the payment from property passing under the governing instrument of taxes attributable to property not passing under the governing instrument.

In In re Estate of McClaran, 811 So.2d 799 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), the Second District addressed the issue of whether the direction in the decedent's will was effective under section 733.817(5)(h) to override the statutory method of apportionment of estate taxes. McClaran's will provided in pertinent part:

My personal representative shall pay from the residue of my estate ... estate and inheritance taxes assessed by reason of my death, except that the amount, if any, by which the estate and inheritance taxes shall be increased as a result of the inclusion of property in which I may have a qualifying income interest for life or over which I may have a power of appointment shall be paid by the person holding or receiving that property.

Id. at 800 (emphasis in original).

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Just as in McClaran, the direction in the decedent's will does not include an express indication that the property passing under the will is to bear the burden of taxation for property not passing under the will.

2d DCA: Do you have to both "file" and "serve" to beat the 3-month limitations period for will contests?

Aguilar v. Aguilar, --- So.3d ----, 2009 WL 2169133 (Fla. 2d DCA Jul 22, 2009)

If you're going to contest a will one of the first questions you have to ask yourself is "am I too late?"

If the will you want to contest has already been admitted to probate and your client's been served with a "notice of administration," F.S. 733.212 says you've only got 3 months to object. But the mechanics of objecting to a will involve two basic steps: [1] filing your objections with the court and [2] serving "formal" notice of your objections on the opposing party.

In the linked-to opinion the will contestant (the decedent's wife) filed her objections within the 3-month limitations period, but didn't get around to serving formal notice of her objection on the other side until about 4 months later. So was she too late? According to the probate judge the answer was yes, so Wife's objections were dismissed with prejudice. Wrong answer says the 2d DCA. Here's why:

The Wife contends that the statute, section 733.212(3), Florida Statutes (2006), requires only the “filing” of objections within three months and that her failure to serve her motion by formal notice within the three-month deadline is not fatal to her claim. She further contends that even if service by formal notice were required within the three-month period, the Daughters waived the requirement by engaging in protracted litigation before raising their objection to the service. The Daughters respond that section 733.212 is implemented by Florida Probate Rules 5.025, 5.040, and 5.041(d), which require that an objection be served with formal notice by the three-month deadline.

Section 733.212(3) provides:

Any interested person on whom a copy of the notice of administration is served must object to the validity of the will, the qualifications of the personal representative, the venue, or the jurisdiction of the court by filing a petition or other pleading requesting relief in accordance with the Florida Probate Rules on or before the date that is 3 months after the date of service of a copy of the notice of administration on the objecting person, or those objections are forever barred.

(Emphasis added.)

The Wife's motion was an adversary proceeding as defined in rule 5.025(a), and therefore she was required to serve formal notice pursuant to rule 5.025(d)(1). Rule 5.040 sets out the requirements for serving formal notice. It provides in subsection (a)(3)(A) that formal notice shall be served “by sending a copy by any commercial delivery service requiring a signed receipt or by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt.” Rule 5.041(d) governs filing and provides that “[a]ll original papers shall be filed either before service or immediately thereafter.”

None of these rules contain a time requirement for serving formal notice. Further, the trial court's conclusion that section 733.212(3) requires service of formal notice within three months is erroneous because the statute requires only the “filing” of objections within three months after the notice of administration is served. It does not require both filing and service of formal notice within the three-month period. It is undisputed that the Wife's motion was timely filed. We therefore reverse the order dismissing the Wife's motion and direct that it be reinstated.