The Cutler En Banc Opinion: Is the Third DCA Eroding the Protection Afforded to Heirs Who Are to Receive Devises of Florida Homestead?

The Winter 2009 edition of ActionLine contains a short article entitled The Cutler En Banc Opinion: Is the Third DCA Eroding the Protection Afforded to Heirs Who Are to Receive Devises of Florida Homestead? by Melbourne probate attorney Charlie Nash. Charlie's article does a good job of dissecting the 3d DCA's opinion in the Cutler case, which addressed the interplay between the creditor protections applicable to otherwise freely-devisable homestead property in Florida. I previously wrote about the Cutler opinion here.

Lesson learned?

Just because you're dealing with "freely devisable" homestead property doesn't mean you're home free. As made clear by the Cutler decision and Charlie's article, as well as other recent appellate decisions I've written about involving freely-devisable homestead property [click here, herehere], the unintended consequences can blow up even the most carefully crafted estate plan.

Tax Results of Settling Disputes Involving Marital-Deduction (QTIP) Trusts

A "QTIP trust" allows a person's estate to receive a 100% estate-tax marital deduction for assets left in trust for a surviving spouse for life, with the remainder of the trust assets going to the settlor's children (or other heirs) once the surviving spouse passes away [click here].  A common source of trust litigation is the hostility often existing between children of a first marriage and the step-parent who becomes the life-time beneficiary of the QTIP trust.

One very effective long-term solution for this type of litigation is to permanently separate the warring factions by simply terminating the QTIP trust and dividing the assets between the life-time beneficiary (surviving step-mother) and the remainder beneficiaries (children of dad's first marriage).  Sounds simple, but the tax and trust-law issues triggered by this split can be extremely complex.  There are two recently-published resources that provide a solid starting point for trusts-and-estates lawyers looking to get their arms around QTIP splits.

First, I recently wrote about creative lawyering by Florida attorneys working through a QTIP trust split/termination and related IRS Private Letter Ruling 200844010, in which the IRS outlined the operative tax issues and blessed the tax results the parties were attempting to achieve in their settlement agreement [click here].

Second, in a follow-up to his blog entry discussing the QTIP-termination PLR [click here], Florida tax attorney/blogger Charles Rubin, of Gutter Chaves Josepher Rubin Forman Fleisher P.A., recently published an article entitled Tax Results of Settling Disputes Involving QTIP Trusts.  Mr. Rubin's article does an excellent job of expanding on the tax issues reflected in IRS Private Letter Ruling 200844010 and pointing out all the other potential traps for lawyers involved in similar cases.

Presto!  You're now a QTIP trust termination expert.

My Running List for 2010

This is my running list of significant Florida trusts-and-estates appellate opinions for 2010. The criteria for inclusion is somewhat subjective, so I'm certainly not guaranteeing that I've identified every case that could conceivably be related to contested probate or trust matters in Florida. However, if you think I've missed an important appellate decision that deserves wider notice please let me know. As new appellate decisions are published they'll be added to the list.

All of the appellate opinions listed below are hyperlinked to a copy of the opinion and my blog post commenting on the case.

  1. Rachid v. Perez, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 173776 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan 20, 2010) (Getting out of Mediation Agreements)
  2. Burgess v. Prince, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 199422 (Fla. 2d DCA Jan. 22, 2010) (Trust construction)
  3. Foster v. Estate of Gomes, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 322170 (Fla. 5th DCA Jan. 29, 2010) (Marital agreements waiving inheritance rights)
  4. Doe v. Suntrust Bank, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 323031 (Fla. 2d DCA Jan 29, 2010) (DNA testing in trust and probate litigation)
  5. Thomas v. Thomas, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 391833 (Fla. 5th DCA Feb 05, 2010) (Limitations period for accounting objections)
  6. Grainger v. Wald, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 479862 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb 12, 2010) (Properly serving notice to creditors)
  7. In re Estate of Harrison, Slip Copy, 2010 WL 503077 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. Jan 29, 2010) (Strategic use of Florida’s 2-year Non-claim Statute)
  8. Morrison v. West, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 532792 (Fla. 4th DCA Feb 17, 2010) (Payment to out-of-state probate lawyer)
  9. Pajares v. Donahue, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 934101 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar 17, 2010) (Will Construction; Homestead Devise)
  10. Foundation For Developmentally Disabled, Inc. v. Step By Step Early Childhood Educ. And Therapy Center, Inc., --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 1135901 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar 26, 2010) (Charitable Gifts Litigation)
  11. United States v. Guyton, Jr., 2010 WL 1172428 (11th Cir. March 26, 2010) (Personal representative’s liability for decedent’s unpaid income taxes)
  12. Hall v. Maal, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 1212794 (Fla. 1st DCA March 30, 2010) (No common-law marriage in Florida)
  13. Hill v. Davis, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 1347314 (Fla. 1st DCA March 31, 2010) (Limitations period; objecting to Personal Representative’s appointment)
  14. Baillargeon v. Sewell, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 1727842 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr 30, 2010) (No class-action claims in probate proceedings)
  15. Miller v. Kresser, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 1779899 (Fla. 4th DCA May 05, 2010) (Spendthrift trust creditor protection)
  16. Bessard v. Bessard, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 1875627 (Fla. 3d DCA May 12, 2010) (Statutory attorney’s fees in Power of Attorney litigation)
  17. Yawt v. Carlisle, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 1879697 (Fla. 4th DCA May 12, 2010) (Raising new claims in Trust Litigation)
  18. Fernandez v. Guardianship of Fernandez, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 2178831(Fla. 3d DCA Jun 02, 2010) (How to conduct guardianship trials)
  19. Timmons v. Ingraham, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 2217637 (Fla. 5th DCA Jun 04, 2010) (Step children are NOT lineal descendants under FL law)
  20. Townsend v. Morton, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 2218327 (Fla. 5th DCA Jun 04, 2010) (Rescinding fraudulently obtained deeds)
  21. Olmstead v. F.T.C., --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 2518106 (Fla. Jun 24, 2010) (Asset protection and single-member LLCs)
  22. Brennan v. Estate of Brennan, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 2866987 (Fla. 5th DCA Jul 23, 2010) (Litigating lost wills)
  23. Magill v. Dresner, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 3025111 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug 04, 2010) (Judicial deference to pre-need designation of guardian)
  24. Price v. Austin, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 3120212 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug 10, 2010) (Deadlines for attorney’s fee motions in guardianship litigation)
  25. Zayas-Hood v. Jusino, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 3120217 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug 10, 2010) (Extending deadlines to pay creditor claims)

1st DCA: power of attorney authorized execution of binding arbitration agreement

Five Points Health Care, Ltd. v. Mallory, --- So.2d ----, 2008 WL 5411834 (Fla. 1st DCA Dec 31, 2008)

Under Florida law an attorney-in-fact's authority is limited solely to actions "specifically enumerated in the durable power of attorney." F.S. 709.08(7)(a). Sounds simple enough. But the question courts have to grapple with is how specific does the enumerated grant of authority in the durable power of attorney (DPOA) have to be?

With respect to arbitration agreements, the 2d DCA has recently come out at both ends of the spectrum. In January of 2008 the 2d DCA ruled in In re Estate of McKibbin that a specific reference to the arbitration agreement in the DPOA was needed. Having apparently experienced a change of heart, a few months later in September of 2008 the 2d DCA basically reversed itself, ruling in Jaylene, Inc. v. Moots that a general grant of authority in the DPOA was all you need.

My guess is that most Florida appellate courts will err on the side of enforcing arbitration agreements whenever they can. So I expect they'll enforce arbitration agreements executed under broadly-stated grants of authority in DPOA's more often than not. And that's exactly what happened in the linked-to opinion.

In the linked-to opinion the 1st DCA described the key provisions of the contested DPOA as follows:

The nursing home admission agreement which contained the arbitration clause was signed by Carlene Mallory under the durable power of attorney (POA) granted her by her mother. The “Durable Power of Attorney” signed by Alfreda Mallory a year before she was admitted to the nursing home stated, in part:

All acts done by my attorney-in-fact pursuant to this power shall bind me, my heirs, devisees and personal representatives; provided, however, that all such acts performed hereunder shall be for my benefit only and not for the benefit of my attorney-in-fact.

The POA listed seventeen paragraphs specifying the powers of the attorney-in-fact, one of which stated that the attorney-in-fact was authorized to: “Prosecute, defend and settle all actions or other legal proceeding touching my estate or any part of it or touching any matter in which I may be concerned in any way.” The seventeenth paragraph authorized the attorney-in-fact to: “Do anything regarding my estate, property and affairs that I could do for myself.” 

Based on the foregoing, and relying in part on the 2d DCA's McKibbin decision, the trial court ruled that because the DPOA didn't contain a specific reference to arbitration agreements, the contested arbitration clause was unenforceable.  The 1st DCA reversed, basing its analysis on the less stringent standard applied in the 2d DCA's Jaylene opinion:

[W]e find persuasive Jaylene, Inc. v. Moots, 2008 WL 4181140 (Fla. 2d DCA Sept. 12, 2008), in which the Second District Court of Appeal declined to follow its prior opinion in McKibbin, noting that “the opinion in McKibbin does not set forth the language of the power of attorney under review in that case” and “is not controlling here where the POA unambiguously makes a broad, general grant of authority to the attorney-in-fact.” Id. at p. 3. In Jaylene, the court reversed an order denying a motion to compel arbitration in circumstances similar to the case at issue.

.  .  .  .  .

We note that the trial court did not have the benefit of the opinion in Jaylene when it entered its order. Nevertheless, we find the reasoning in that opinion persuasive, and we find that the POA at issue is sufficiently similar to the POA at issue in that case to warrant application of that reasoning to the case at issue.

The order denying the motion to compel arbitration is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.

Lesson learned?

I have no doubt that the specific context of this case and others addressing the enforceability of arbitration agreements signed by attorneys-in-fact operating under DPOA's is significant. Which means you need to be careful when looking to these opinions in the types of cases probate lawyers usually run into as part of their practice: DPOA's being used to change estate planning documents [click here] or change life-insurance beneficiary designation forms [click here, here] or otherwise defraud elderly clients [click here]. In those cases I expect you'll find appellate courts will demand a much higher level of specificity in terms of the authority granted under the DPOA.

L'Affaire Madoff: what trustees and other fiduciaries need to be thinking about

At this year's Heckerling conference in Florida one of the speakers asked a conference room of (I'd guess) over a thousand trusts-and-estates attorneys/CPAs from across the country how many of them had clients affected by the Madoff scandal: easily 9 out of 10 raised their hands. The breadth and scope of this scandal is truly amazing.

As you might expect there was a good deal of discussion regarding what trustees and other fiduciaries (our clients) need to be thinking about if they're unlucky enough to be administering trusts or estates that invested with Madoff. Here are a few of the highlights:

[1.]  For those trustees and other fiduciary investors who cashed out before the fraud was detected . . . you're not out of the woods yet. Think "claw back".

As reported in an excellent on-line piece by the law firm K&L Gates entitled The Madoff Dissolution: A Consideration of the Bayou Precedent and Possible Next Steps, in Ponzi-scheme cases such as Madoff's courts have regularly held that each individual redemption payment made to an investor who cashed out before the scheme is discovered is presumptively a fraudulent transfer. Based on this fraudulent-transfer theory courts can compel investors to pay back funds received from the Ponzi scheme unless they can affirmatively show that they received the funds in good faith and for value.

Citing to a similar case, the Bayou matter, presided over by the very same NY judge presiding over the Madoff case, the linked-to K&L Gate piece gave us a glimpse of what Madoff investors can look forward to:

In 2006, Bayou’s court-appointed receiver brought over 130 fraudulent transfer adversary proceedings against Bayou investors that had redeemed fictitious profit and principal within two years of Bayou’s bankruptcy filing. Later in 2008, the Bayou receiver brought New York state law claims against persons redeeming up to six years before the bankruptcy filing. In a series of rulings, the court held that redemption payments from a Ponzi scheme presumptively satisfied the “actual fraud” prong of the fraudulent transfer standard and that the “good faith” affirmative defense requires an objective test of whether a reasonable and prudent investor should have been on inquiry notice of the fraud, and, if on inquiry notice, the redeemer was diligent in its investigation.[11] In addition, the court ruled as a matter of law that redemption payments received by investors in excess of their original principal based on artificially inflated results, or so-called “fictitious profits,” were required to be refunded to the estate, regardless of the redeemer’s good faith.[12] Moreover, the court held that a redeeming investor cannot utilize the good faith affirmative defense unless it can show it conducted a diligent investigation of each potential problem or red flag.[13]

As a result of these rulings, all of the investors in the Bayou matter who redeemed their investments within the six-year clawback period were ordered to return fictitious profits and may be required to pay pre-judgment interest on those profits. Over 90 redeemers have settled with the estate for the return of false profits and a portion of their principal. In addition, the court has ordered several dozen investors to refund all of their principal. The court upheld the good faith defenses of a small number of redeemers, and ordered trial of a handful more cases. To date, the Bayou receiver has recovered through settlement and legal rulings approximately $68 million, with an anticipated litigation recovery for creditors of the Bayou estate, net of expenses, of between 15 and 20 cents per dollar.

For those of you looking to drill down into this issue a good starting place would be the two Bayou opinions cited in the K&L Gates piece: In re Bayou Group, LLC, 362 B.R. 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) and In re Bayou Group, LLC, 396 B.R. 810, *__ (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).

[2.]  What tax issues should you be thinking about?

From an income-tax perspective, the consensus seems to be that Madoff investors need to focus on (1) entitlement to a theft loss deduction under IRC § 165 and (2) the ability to file amended returns seeking refunds for taxes paid on phantom income reported from the Madoff firm. These issues are summarized nicely in an on-line piece published by the Gibbons law firm entitled Federal Income Tax Treatment of Investment Losses From L'Affaire Madoff.

Warning: make sure your clients don't forfeit claiming a refund for taxes paid on 2005 phantom income. Here's how this point was summarized in an on-line piece published by the Gibbons law firm:

For most taxpayers, the current open years are 2005, 2006, and 2007. A taxpayer will need to file an amended return for 2005 by April 15, 2009 if the taxpayer filed the 2005 return on or before April 15, 2006. If a taxpayer obtained an extension for filing until October 15, 2006, the taxpayer will have three years from the date of filing in 2006 to file the amended return.

By filing an amended return, the taxpayer implicitly reduces its adjusted basis by the amount of the reduction in reported income. This reduction will also reduce the overall amount of the theft loss deduction.

For a comprehensive list of on-line sources addressing the tax fallout from the Madoff case go to More Tax Planning for Madoff Victims on the Tax Prof Blog.

WSJ: Obama Plans to Keep Estate Tax

Win, lose or draw, I think all sides can agree that finality on the estate-tax front would be a welcomed development. And the wait may be coming to an end. The WSJ reported today in Obama Plans to Keep Estate Tax that the new administration has concluded "that if they don't act now, it will be politically harder to go ahead with their plan to resurrect the estate tax once it has disappeared [in 2010]."  Stay tuned for an announcement "within weeks":

The Senate Finance Committee will move within weeks on legislation to reverse that law, and Mr. Obama is expected to detail his estate-tax preservation proposal in his budget next month, congressional tax writers said.

So what can we expect? Here's what the WSJ is predicting:

Under the Obama plan detailed during the campaign, the estate tax would be locked in permanently at the rate and exemption levels that took effect this year. That would exempt estates of $3.5 million -- $7 million for couples -- from any taxation. The value of estates above that would be taxed at 45%. If the tax were returned to Clinton-era levels, it would exclude $1 million from taxation with the rest taxed at 55%.

Portability

Nothing surprising here, but expect "portability" of the estate-tax marital deduction to also be part of the plan. I predict this change in the law will ultimately end up having the most profound impact on your average estate planner's day-to-day practice. "AB" trusts, long the center of most estate plans for married couples, may soon become a thing of the past. As reported by the WSJ in October of 2008 in On Death and Taxes ... and the Candidates, both candidates were including portability as part of their estate-tax reform proposals:

Both candidates agree the exemption amount should be easily portable. "Families should not be required to undertake complex and unnecessary financial planning or be penalized for failing to take advantage of sophisticated financial strategies," says Jason Furman, economic policy director for the Obama campaign. The Democrats' nominee "believes we should eliminate the estate tax for 99.7% of families -- and this is part of his plan to accomplish that goal," says Mr. Furman.

.  .  .  .  .

Under current law this year, a married couple could leave a total of $4 million to their children without federal estate tax. "But because the exemptions aren't portable, quite a bit of planning is necessary to achieve this result," says John M. Olivieri, a tax partner at the law firm of White & Case LLP in New York City.

Suppose a husband and wife each has $2 million. The husband dies and leaves everything to his wife. Although there's no federal estate tax because of the marital exemption, the wife now has a $4 million estate but only a $2 million exemption, Mr. Olivieri says. Consequently, if she dies this year and leaves her $4 million to her children, "her estate will be hit with a federal estate tax of about $900,000," based on this year's rate structure, Mr. Olivieri says. "A similar problem arises if the entire $4 million is owned by the husband and the wife dies first."

To avoid the problem, "many married couples expend considerable time, effort, and money to avoid wasting their combined federal exemptions," says Mr. Olivieri. "But if the exemptions were portable, none of this would be necessary." However, even if the exemption does become portable for federal estate-tax purposes, Mr. Olivieri points out that many people may need to take special estate-planning steps anyway because of state-tax issues.

 

3d DCA: Post-mediation litigation triggered by settlement agreement's fuzzy release clause

Sandra O'Neill v. Scher, --- So.2d ----, 2008 WL 5352183 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec 24, 2008)

In the linked-to opinion the parties executed a settlement agreement supposedly putting an end to their litigation involving contested probate claims. The settlement agreement contained the following release language:

3. Sandra O'Neill hereby releases any present and/or future interest which she may have in and to the following:

a. The Estate of Benjamin Scher opened in Miami-Dade County, Florida, under case number 06-0057 CP (04);

b. The Benjamin Scher Revocable Inter Vivos Trust dated 8/30/01, as amended and restated on 8/11/04, and/or any successor trust created through said trust, including but not limited to Marital Trust, Credit Shelter Trust, and Trust for the Benefit of Cassandra O'Neill;

c. Benjamin Scher Irrevocable Trust dated 9/1/99;

d. Any interest claim or expectancy of an inheritance from or against the Estate of Sophie Scher, including but not limited to any testamentary documents executed by Sophie Scher.

e. The Sophie Scher Revocable Inter Vivos Trust dated 8/30/01, as amended and re-stated on 8/9/05.

f. Any interest claim or expectancy of an inheritance from or against the Estate of Richard Scher, including but not limited to any testamentary documents executed by Richard Scher.

4. It is understood that this agreement is a memorial of the terms of the within settlement. However, the parties hereby agree to execute formal releases in accordance with the terms set forth herein.

Almost immediately after executing their settlement agreement the parties were back in court. One of the issues in dispute was whether the text quoted above should be limited to its own terms or read broadly to encompass a universal general release.  The probate judge sided with the general-release argument and ended up getting reversed on appeal for the following reasons:

We reverse .  .  .  that portion of the trial court's order instructing O'Neill to execute the “general release” forwarded to her by Scher's counsel. As counsel for Scher conceded at oral argument, the release that the trial court ordered O'Neill to execute is overly broad and does not accurately reflect the release of interests and/or claims to which O'Neill agreed in the settlement agreement. Indeed, O'Neill only agreed in paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Settlement to release six specific present and/or future interests. The general release, on the other hand, contains broad provisions releasing O'Neill's present and/or future claims for matters, persons, and entities not listed or considered in the settlement agreement.FN2 On remand, the parties shall draft a release concerning only those six specific claims contained in paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Settlement, and shall release no other present and/or future claims.

FN2. We also note that the general release, which the trial court ordered O'Neill to execute, disposed of the interests of O'Neill's “heirs, executors, and administrators.” Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Settlement, however, contains no such language and, on remand, the release presented to O'Neill for execution shall contain no such language.

Lesson learned:

First, if your client bargained for a general release, then write it into the deal or attach it to your contract as a stand-alone exhibit. As I've written before, you don't want to rely on a court to fill this gap for you [click here].  Second, if you're dealing with an especially litigious antagonist, you'll be sorry if you leave any room for future attacks. Click here for an example of a settlement agreement that worked precisely because all future avenues of attack were anticipated and explicitly cut off by the express terms of the parties' settlement agreement.