Florida Judges Have "Limited Discretion" When Appointing Guardians
Wilson v. Robinson, 2005 WL 3499495 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec 23, 2005)
F.S. § 744.312 lays out the statutory preferences and factors applicable in Florida regarding the appointment of guardians. In this case Robert Wilson appealed an order entered by Seminole County Judge James E.C. Perry denying his petition to be appointed plenary guardian of his wife, Beverly Wilson (who was incapacitated due to Alzheimer's disease), and, instead, appointing their daughter, Bambi Robinson, to serve as Ms. Wilson's guardian.
Although unclear from the opinion, it appears Ms. Wilson expressed a preference for the appointment of her husband as her guardian. On appeal, the Fifth DCA upheld the trial court's appointment of Ms. Wilson's daughter as plenary guardian based on the following:
"[I]n guardianship cases, as in other cases, discretionary acts are subject to the test of reasonableness, i.e., they must be supported by logic and justification for the result and founded on substantial, competent evidence." In re Guardianship of Sapp, 868 So.2d 687, 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing In re Guardianship of Sitter, 779 So.2d 346, 348 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)); see generally Canova v. Smith ex rel. S.G.S., 854 So.2d 852 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (upholding a guardianship decision because it was supported by substantial competent evidence). Discretion is abused when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980).
The trial court's discretion in the selection of a guardian has been described as "limited discretion" in the sense that it must be exercised consistent with the Florida Statutes. See Poteat v. Guardianship of Poteat, 771 So.2d 569, 572 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (citing In re Castro, 344 So.2d 270, 271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)). (Emphasis added.)
The concept of "limited discretion" is really not very limited. The statutory scheme of preferences and considerations is broad. Section 744.312(1) provides that the court "may appoint any person who is fit and proper and qualified to act as guardian, whether related to the ward or not." Section 744.312(4) provides that a qualified standby or preneed guardian must be appointed "unless the court determines that appointing such person is contrary to the best interests of the ward." Section 744.309(3) provides that "No person who ... is incapable of discharging the duties of a guardian or who is otherwise unsuitable shall be appointed to act as guardian." If, as this case suggests, the Canakaris standard of review for the exercise of discretion applies, it seems to me that the trial judge has a fairly wide discretion to appoint the applicant deemed most suitable. If the trial judge can articulate any reasonable basis for the selection, as apparently happened in this case, the decision will be, and probably should be, affirmed.