Behavioral Economics & Probate Litigation

The vast majority of cases settle. So for most probate litigants the question isn't am I going to settle, but when. If we were all the type of rational actors assumed by classic economic theory, knowing when to settle would be easy. All you have to do is get far enough along in the discovery process to accurately run a cost-benefit analysis and voila! the ideal settlement point would be obvious.

But we all know it's never that easy. Why? According to behavioral economists it's because most of us make decisions for all sorts of reasons that often have nothing to do with cold, hard reason. Makes sense to me, especially in the probate litigation context.

Which is why an article in this month's Estate Planning Journal by Chicago, Illinois attorney Howard M. Helsinger entitled Advising the Trust or Estate Litigant: When to Raise or Fold caught my attention. Drawing both on his own experience in the trenches and an impressive grasp of economic theory, Mr. Helsinger does a great job of applying behavioral economics to the dynamics at play in most contested probate proceedings (especially settlement negotiations). Good stuff; highly recommended for the practicing probate litigator. Here's an excerpt:

Lessons from behavioral economics

The conventional mode of valuing a case ... presumes an economically rational actor.... But behavioral economists have for a while now been demonstrating that, in many cases, people do not act like the “rational person” of classical economics. They engage in behaviors that fail to maximize their utility. Various factors discussed in the economics literature are relevant to the situation of estate and trust litigants.

Endowment effect. The value people assign to an item is often exaggerated by what is known as the "endowment effect." Individuals tend to overvalue what they already possess. Assume, for example, that half of a class of law students is given a coffee mug bearing the university's logo. It costs $8 at the university bookstore, and the sticker bearing the price is still on the bottom. Assume also that we know from prior study that the average price people would pay for this coffee mug is $5. Repeated studies have demonstrated that those students who receive this coffee mug will demand more than $5 to part with it, even though they would probably have been willing to pay no more than that to acquire it.

Although an individual might be willing to pay no more than $100 for a ticket to a Chicago Bears game, the same individual will demand more than that to sell the ticket he or she already possesses. Indeed, Duke University students who were fortunate to win a ticket to a Duke basketball game after camping out for a week demanded at average of $2,400 to sell it. Other students, who had also camped out, but had not won a ticket, would pay only $170 to acquire one. Ownership itself clearly enhances the perceived value of possessions. Indeed, even anticipated ownership may increase their value. The longer an auction participant is the high bidder, the greater he or she is likely to value the object.

Passions. Passions also distort judgment. Dan Ariely, for example, describes studies demonstrating, not surprisingly, the distorting impact of sexual arousal on the judgment of young males. That is an unlikely factor in trust and estate litigation, but we should expect similar distortions as a result of grief, sibling rivalry, and the other passions with which we are familiar in decedent's estates.

Undervalue costs. A third significant factor distorting the judgment of litigants is a tendency to overly discount the likely future cost of litigation. Quite independent of the distortions of passion, anger, and possession, people tend to underestimate and undervalue future costs.

Self-serving bias. A fourth factor is known as “self-serving bias.” Its effects are probably familiar to all of us: “[W]hen married couples estimate the fraction of various household tasks they are responsible for, their estimates typically add to more than 100 percent.” Well over half of us think we are better than average as drivers, better than average as managers, in better than average health, more ethical than the average. Empirical studies also demonstrate that “people tend to arrive at judgments of what is fair or right that are biased in the direction of their own self-interests.” The result, in litigation, is likely to be that “[e]ven when parties have the same information, they will come to different conclusions about what a fair settlement would be and base their predictions of judicial behavior on their own views of what is fair.” ...

Practice tips

How then should attorney respond to these irrationalities? Estate and trust litigation is so often carried out in the context of grief, mourning, guilt, jealousy, and anger, that it may be that irrationality is its dominant characteristic. Attorneys advising in such circumstances have an opportunity to temper those distortions....

An especially suggestive study indicates that in confronting self-serving bias, it is not sufficient to merely make litigants aware of the existence of such biases. They are likely to assume that the other side may be subject to such biases, but not them. What has been shown to be effective, however, is asking the litigant actually to list the weaknesses in his or her own case. We lawyers should be aware of such weaknesses—asking our clients to make such a list would be an easy way of enhancing their awareness and perhaps reducing their self-serving bias. Of course, we lawyers, if we are to make effective use of techniques such as this, need to be aware of our own self-serving biases and sensitive to the countervailing temptations we may ourselves face to fan the flames of litigation. 

1st DCA: Does Rule 1.525's 30-day deadline for attorney's fee motions apply to contested guardianship proceedings?

Price v. Austin, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 3120212 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug 10, 2010)

Over the last few years probate lawyers have been scratching their heads wondering if, when and how Civ. Pro. Rule 1.525, the rule setting a 30-day post-judgment deadline for filing fee motions in civil litigation, applies to contested probate and trust proceedings. This is an important issue; the last thing any lawyer wants to do is blow a deadline for claiming fees on behalf of his client. Here's what the rule says:

Any party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorneys' fees, or both shall serve a motion no later than 30 days after filing of the judgment, including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of voluntary dismissal.

By now there's no question the rule applies in any "adversary" probate proceeding and in all trust litigation. In 2008 the 2d DCA held here that the rule applies in Trust litigation, then in 2009 the 5th DCA held here that the rule applies in adversary probate proceedings, and now in the linked-to opinion the 1st DCA has come to the same conclusion with respect to adversary guardianship proceedings:

[A] notice that the proceeding for incapacity was adversary was served on June 12, 2008. On July 7, 2008, the court entered an order determining total incapacity. Over a year later, on September 18, 2009, appellant served a verified petition to approve payment of fees. Florida Probate Rule 5.025(d)(2) provides that, once a proceeding under the probate rules has been declared to be adversarial, it “shall be conducted similar to suits of a civil nature and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern, including entry of defaults.” Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 requires a motion for attorney's fees to be filed “no later than 30 days after filing the judgment....” In Hays v. Lawrence, 1 So.3d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), the court held that, in a proceeding declared as adversarial, rule 1.525 governed a motion for attorney's fees filed pursuant to section 733.106(2) and affirmed a denial of a claim for attorney's fees as untimely under the rule. Although Hays involved a different fee statute than the case before us, section 733.106(2) and section 744.108, applicable here, are similar. Both statutes are legislative expressions of the desirability of the payment of attorney's fees for services rendered under the specified proceeding. Accordingly, because the petition for attorney's fees was untimely filed under rule 1.525, the trial court's order denying fees is AFFIRMED.

Must be an "adversary" proceeding:

An important point to keep in mind with respect to contested guardianship (and probate) proceedings is that Rule 1.525 only applies to "adversary" proceedings (assume the rule applies to all trust proceedings). So if someone tries to block your fee petition by citing to this rule, make sure your judge understands it simply does NOT apply to probate and guardianship proceedings that have NOT been declared adversarial in accordance with Florida Probate Rule 5.025.

5th DCA: Can you prove a "lost will" with affidavits alone, or do you need live witnesses?

Brennan v. Estate of Brennan, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 2866987 (Fla. 5th DCA Jul 23, 2010)

When you can and can't use affidavits is one of those technical questions probate lawyers don't often ask themselves. Especially when you're talking about neutral third-party witnesses (such as the witnesses to a will signing), my sense is that most lawyers will opt for affidavits whenever possible to avoid the expense and inconvenience of hauling live witnesses into court.

The issue in this case was whether live witness testimony is required as a matter of law to prove a lost will, or whether affidavits alone will do if your probate judge says OK. But first a short recap on the law governing lost wills in Florida:

  1. When an original will that is known to have existed cannot be located after the death of the decedent, the presumption is that the testator destroyed the will with the intent to revoke it.
  2. The proponent of the lost will has the burden of introducing competent, substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of revocation.
  3. The first step in overcoming the presumption of revocation is by the establishment and admission to probate of the lost or destroyed will pursuant to F.S. 733.207.
  4. Under F.S. 733.207, if you can come up with a copy of the lost will, then all you need is "the testimony of . . . one disinterested witness" to prove up the terms or "content" of the lost will you're trying to probate.

For prior blog posts covering lost/destroyed wills click here, here, here, here.

5th DCA says NO to affidavits:

The 5th DCA ruled that "the submission of affidavits was insufficient pursuant to section 733.207 to establish [a] lost will." In other words, live witness testimony is required, it's NOT optional. Here's how the 5th DCA explained its ruling:

In In re Estate of Parker, 382 So.2d at 654, the supreme court, interpreting an earlier version of section 733.207, discussed the proof required to establish a lost will in the presence and absence of a correct copy of the will, explaining: “A draft which is an accurate and correct reflection of the contents of a lost will is not the same as a ‘correct copy.’ To prove the former the statute requires the testimony of two witnesses. To prove the latter, the testimony of one witness suffices.” (Emphasis added.)

The Third District took the same position in In re Estate of Hatten, 880 So.2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), when it stated: “As explained by the statute, establishment of a will can be accomplished only if there is the testimony of a disinterested witness plus a copy of the will, or if there is the testimony of two disinterested witnesses.” (Emphasis added.) See also In re Estate of Musil, 965 So.2d 1157 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (niece failed to present testimony of at least one disinterested witness to prove execution and content of will as required to establish lost or destroyed will); In re Estate of Kero, 591 So.2d 675 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (testimony of one subscribing witness to original will's proper execution proved content of original).

In this case, the only testimony in support of the petition to establish lost will came from Ms. Honsberger, who had an interest in the outcome of the case. The statute requires the testimony of at least one disinterested witness, which she was not. Although the trial judge indicated, and the parties agreed, that an additional evidentiary hearing would be scheduled so that Ms. Honsberger could present the testimony of a disinterested witness, no such hearing was conducted. Instead, the trial court admitted the lost 2002 will to probate upon the submission of witness affidavits alone. These affidavits merely stated that the witnesses saw the decedent execute the will and that they signed as witnesses immediately thereafter. Appellants did not stipulate to the submission of affidavits in lieu of testimony. Accordingly, we find an evidentiary hearing should have been conducted and that the submission of affidavits was insufficient pursuant to section 733.207 to establish the lost will.

Lesson learned?

A case about affidavits may seem trivial. It's not. Why? Because it's the type of "in-the-trenches" know how experienced lawyers bring to bear when meeting with new clients and estimating how long a case will take to litigate and how much it's going to cost. If your client knows - up front - that you can't get a lost will admitted to probate in the absence of a mini-trial with live witnesses, and that mini-trials are expensive and can take a long time to litigate, then all is well. If not, then all will not be well once everyone realizes what was supposed to be a simple "on the papers" proceeding you could knock out with a few affidavits . . . is anything but simple.

No estate tax in 2010 = potential probate litigation: Florida enacts statutory fix

Congress shocked everyone by letting the estate tax lapse in 2010. What I've found most interesting about this state of affairs are the unintended consequences:

First, no estate tax in 2010 is great news for the super rich, like George Steinbrenner's heirs, but bad news for the moderately wealthy, people who have assets between $1.3 million and $3.5 million. For these families dying in 2010 likely means higher taxes. This is a federal tax issue only Congress can address.

Second, no estate tax in 2010 could lead to the unintended disinheritance of widows and widowers, which could in turn lead to expensive legal fights among family members. Potential inheritance litigation caused by Congressional inaction is a state-law issue that state legislators can step in and fix. And that's exactly what they've been doing.

Increased probate litigation threat: Florida's statutory fix: 733.1051 & 736.04114

As reported by Forbes in States Race To Clean Up Congress' Estate Tax Mess, state legislators have been busy passing legislation aimed at avoiding the unintended disinheritance of widows and widowers caused by the unforeseen lapse of the federal estate tax in 2010. Florida has now joined the club with passage of two new pieces of legislation: 733.1051 (governing wills), and 736.04114 (governing trusts).

These new statutes aren't available as yet online, but you can see their complete text by scrolling through this bill (which creates 733.1051) and scrolling through this bill (which creates 736.04114). This White Paper also explains the reasoning behind the new legislation.

Most states enacted simple one-size-fits-all statutes. The upside to this approach is that it's less expensive to implement. Here's how these statutes were described in the Forbes piece:

Most of the new emergency laws would set a default rule for interpreting wills and trusts while the federal estate tax is repealed, if the document itself doesn't spell one out. The rule: Any tax terms or formulas should be read as if the estate tax law of 2009 were still in effect. The proposed emergency laws also typically include a backstop provision allowing any potential beneficiary or executor to go to court, within a year from the date of death, if he or she doesn't think that this default is what the deceased really wanted.

The downside to the one-size-fits-all approach is that saving court costs is given priority over ensuring the testator's intent is followed. Maybe the testator knew exactly what would happen if he died in 2010 and intended that outcome? A one-size-fits all statute could essentially strip this testator of his testamentary freedom.

Florida didn't adopt a one-size-fits-all statute, opting instead for a more nuanced approach aimed at determining the testator's probable intent from all of the facts and circumstances. If your primary goal is effectuating testator intent, Florida's approach makes sense. But it comes at a cost: Florida's legislation makes it impossible to avoid the time and expense of a judicial construction proceeding. Here's how the Forbes piece described Florida's approach:

One renegade state--Florida--is proposing to send folks with ambiguous documents to court from the start to determine the deceased's intent, instead of assuming the deceased wanted to follow the estate tax law of 2009. The court could consider outside evidence, such as the estate attorney's testimony. The proposed law would allow estate assets to be used to pay for this proceeding and says that heirs might have to wait for distributions pending the outcome of the court's decision.

5th DCA on Rescinding Fraudulently Obtained Deeds

Townsend v. Morton, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 2218327 (Fla. 5th DCA Jun 04, 2010)

Deeds are common will-substitutes, so no surprise they come up with some frequency in inheritance disputes . . .  and this blog [click here, here, here]. This case is about when a court will let you unwind a deed that was "procured by fraud, deceit, trickery, or artifice." All common accusations in inheritance disputes.

The property at the center of this family drama was a 46.3 acre cattle farm mom had inherited from her father. In exchange for son paying over $137,000 of mom's debts, she executed a deed conveying a remainder interest in the cattle farm to son, retaining a life estate for herself. Some time later son figures out that the guy who's been living with mom is actually married to her. According to the 5th DCA, mom had repeatedly "lied to him about her marital status." Although unstated in the opinion, mom's marital status is significant. Why? Because § 4(c) of Article X of Florida's Constitution requires both spouses to sign any deed conveying an interest in homestead property. Oops! I'm guessing son - a licensed real estate broker for 16 years - spotted this homestead issue, so he got mom and her husband to both sign a new deed. So far so good. 

Here's the problem: The third deed conveyed full title to son, no life estate for mom; he now owned the farm all by himself. Mom cried foul, saying she had no idea she'd just signed over the family farm.

As a lawyer for mom, if you heard this story you'd know there's a lawsuit in here somewhere. The tough part is figuring out how to fit these facts into a cause of action your client can successfully pursue in court. Well, look no further. Think "Rescission". And here's your road map courtesy of the 5th DCA:

Rescission is an equitable remedy adopted long ago by the courts, and the continued vitality of cases of ancient vintage that have applied this remedy is a testament to its age. See, e.g., Smith v. Richards, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 26, 36, 10 L.Ed. 42 (1839); Columbus Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Mgmt. Co., 116 Fla. 464, 156 So. 893, 897 (1934). Over the many years that the courts have utilized the equitable remedy of rescission, some principles have been firmly established regarding its applicability.

The courts have established that rescission is a proper remedy to relieve a party from obligations and provisions of an instrument procured by fraud, deceit, trickery, or artifice. Smith; Columbus Hotel. As the court explained in Columbus Hotel:

Equity will grant to a complaining party rescission of an agreement procured through fraud, deceit, artifice, or trickery practiced upon him by the opposite party, even after it had been partially executed, in cases where it is made to appear that the complaining party would not have entered into such agreement, nor changed his position thereby, if it had not been for the influence of such fraud, deceit, artifice, or trickery so practiced upon him.

156 So. at 897; see Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 36 (“In 1 Maddock's Chancery, 208, it is thus stated. If, indeed, a man, upon a treaty for any contract, make a false representation, whether knowingly or not, by means of which he puts the party bargaining under a mistake upon the terms of bargain, it is a fraud, and relievable in equity.”); see also Webb v. Kirkland, 899 So.2d 344, 346-47 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that rescission of a warranty deed procured by fraud is appropriate); Bass v. Farish, 616 So.2d 1146, 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). The courts also have established that in order to grant rescission of an instrument, the other party must be restored to the position it occupied prior to its execution. See Webb; Bass; Lang v. Horne, 156 Fla. 605, 23 So.2d 848, 853 (1945).

Townsend claims that the third deed was obtained by fraud and should be rescinded. The elements that must be established to prove a claim of fraud are: “(1) a false statement concerning a material fact; (2) the representor's knowledge that the representation is false; (3) an intention that the representation induce another to act on it; and, (4) consequent injury by the party acting in reliance on the representation.” Johnson v. Davis, 480 So.2d 625, 627 (Fla.1985); see also Webb, 899 So.2d at 346; Taylor Woodrow Homes Fla., Inc. v. 4/46-A Corp., 850 So.2d 536, 542 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Lopez-Infante v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 809 So.2d 13, 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).

3d DCA on when you're entitled to statutory attorney's fees in power-of-attorney litigation

Bessard v. Bessard, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 1875627 (Fla. 3d DCA May 12, 2010)

Durable powers of attorney (POAs) are an integral part of modern estate planning. The prevalence of POAs means they come up with some frequency in estate-related litigation [click here]. That's what happened in the linked-to case. What's interesting about this case is it's focus on F.S. 709.08(11), a little-known subclause of Florida's durable POA statute entitling the prevailing party in POA litigation to attorney's fees and costs. Here's what the statute says:

(11) DAMAGES AND COSTS.-- In any judicial action under this section, including, but not limited to, the unreasonable refusal of a third party to allow an attorney in fact to act pursuant to the power, and challenges to the proper exercise of authority by the attorney in fact, the prevailing party is entitled to damages and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees.

In this case a father signed a durable POA granting his son ("Joseph") authority over his property while he underwent treatment for leukemia, tuberculosis "and other medical infirmities." The POA was challenged in court by Joseph's mother and two sisters. Before the court could rule on the merits of the case, Joseph's father died. At that point Joseph sought to have the case dismissed as moot. Joseph also filed a "renunciation" of his powers under the POA.

The trial court granted Joseph's motion to dismiss, but also granted a motion for attorney's fees and costs filed by his mother and sisters as the prevailing parties. On appeal the 3d DCA affirmed the trial court's attorney's fee order as follows:

As to the attorney's fees and costs awarded to the appellees as the prevailing parties, we also affirm. Section 709.08(11), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that the prevailing party in power of attorney litigation is entitled to attorney's fees and costs. The determination of the prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees and costs is based on whether the party seeking fees succeeded on any significant issue(s) in the litigation. See Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So.2d 807, 810 (Fla.1992) (holding “that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorney's fees”); Boxer Max Corp. v. Cane A. Sucre, Inc., 905 So.2d 916, 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“The ‘prevailing party,’ for purposes of attorney's fees, is a party which the trial court determines prevailed on significant issues in the litigation.”).

Joseph contends that because the trial court never determined whether the signature on the power of attorney was executed by Mr. Bessard, and if executed whether it was done so knowingly and voluntarily, the trial court erred in granting the appellees attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing parties. We disagree. The appellees sought to have the power of attorney declared void, contending that the document was a fraud. When Joseph renunciated the powers granted to him under the power of attorney, agreed that the document be declared null and void, and destroyed the original and all copies, his actions necessarily mooted the complaint and was the functional equivalent of a judgment or verdict in favor of the appellees. See Augustin v. Health Options of S. Fla., Inc., 580 So.2d 314, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (finding that when the defendant changed its position in the matter and made full payment as prayed for in the plaintiff's complaint, it necessarily mooted the complaint and was the functional equivalent of a judgment or verdict in favor of the plaintiff entitling the plaintiff to an award of attorney's fees as the prevailing party); see also Smith v. Adler, 596 So.2d 696, 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (holding that “it is [the] results, not [the] procedure, which govern the determination” of which party prevailed for purposes of awarding attorney's fees).

Lesson learned?

Litigation can be very expensive. Any time your client has a shot at getting the losing side to pay his or her attorney's fees, it's a BIG deal. Just as importantly, the downside risk of F.S. 709.08(11) needs to be understood by all at the outset. This disclosure should be prominent in your retainer agreements.

In will-construction dispute, 5th DCA says NO to stepmother's attempted disinheritance of former husband's children

Timmons v. Ingraham, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 2217637 (Fla. 5th DCA Jun 04, 2010)

As reported here by the WSJ, "When it comes to blended families, estate planning can be a special kind of hell." A corollary to that observation: blended families are always at risk for probate litigation. Yes, I said always! This case is an example of the type of probate litigation blended families can find themselves in and why these cases need to be treated like ticking time bombs both at the estate-planning phase and in the probate context.

Blended Family Red Flag: Stepmother as Beneficiary of Dad's Marital Trust = Estate Planning Trouble:

In 1999 "Frank Sr." died married to "Myrtle". Frank Sr. had two adopted children from a prior marriage, and Myrtle had four children of her own, whom Frank Sr. had never adopted. Frank Sr's will provided that at his death all assets would go in trust for Myrtle for life, and at her death everything would go to the couple's six children in equal shares. Frank Sr's will also gave Myrtle a "power of appointment" that could be exercised only in favor of his "descendants." Simple plan; the sort of thing traditional families put in place every day and no one ever contests. But this was a blended family, which means things are never simple.

Fast forward to 2007: Stepmother Myrtle is now attempting to use her power of appointment to disinherit her stepchildren (Frank Sr's two adopted children) in favor of her own four children. Think about these facts: we're not talking about Myrtle's personal assets here, this case is about Myrtle's attempt to give 100% of her former husband's estate to her children and 0% to Frank Sr's children. Yeah, not exactly a pretty picture.

Legal Definition: Stepchildren ≠ Descendants

The technical issue at play in this case was whether the term "descendants" should be interpreted or "construed" to include Frank Jr's stepchildren, thus allowing Myrtle to disinherit Frank Sr's children. Myrtle won at the trial court level, but lost on appeal. Here's how the 5th DCA explained its ruling:

In determining the intent of the settlor, a technical term used in a trust instrument should be accorded its legal definition, unless obviously used by the settlor in a different sense. Knauer v. Barnett, 360 So.2d 399, 406 (Fla.1978). “Lineal descendant” or “descendant” is defined to mean “a person in any generational level down the applicable individual's descending line.” It includes children, grandchildren, or more remote descendants but excludes collateral heirs. § 731.201(9), Fla. Stat. (2007). Adopted children come within the definition of lineal descendants. Lewis v. Green, 389 So.2d 235, 241 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

The co-trustees acknowledge that step-children do not ordinarily fall within the definition of “lineal descendants,” but contend that by expressly expanding the definition of “children” to include his step-children for purposes of his will, Frank Sr. similarly intended to expand the definition of “lineal descendants” to include his step-children and their descendants.” We reject this argument.

While Frank Sr.'s will expressly provided for a different definition of the term “children” than its common or legal definition, no similar attempt was made to modify the common or legal definition of the term “lineal descendants.” The lack of an attempt to redefine “lineal descendant” reflects an intent to have the term interpreted in accordance with its legal definition. Furthermore, Frank Sr. used the term “lineal descendants” on only two other occasions in his will. In one paragraph, Frank Sr. bequested his personal property, in the event Myrtle predeceased him, “to my children who survive me, or if none of my children survive me, then to their lineal descendants, per stirpes.” In a different paragraph, Frank Sr. bequested certain shares of stock “to my son Frank Timmons, Jr., or his lineal descendants per stirpes.” Thus, in both of these instances, the term “lineal descendants” was used in a manner consistent with its legal definition. Finally, there is no language elsewhere in the will reflecting an intent on the part of Frank Sr. to grant Myrtle the power to disinherit his children in favor of her own children.

As previously observed, a technical term used in a trust instrument should be accorded its legal definition unless obviously used by the settlor in a different sense. Knauer. Here, we believe that Frank Sr.'s testamentary document did not reflect an intent (and certainly not an “obvious” one) to expand the definition of lineal descendants to include step-children. Therefore, Myrtle's purported exercise of the limited power of appointment in favor of her natural children was invalid.

Lessons learned?

There's an obvious practice pointer here for estate planners: terms such as "children" and "descendants" are so crucial, they need to be defined in every will or trust. And if you're working with a blended family, it's imperative that you do so. Below is the standard form of "family" definitional clause used at my firm. This is the very first clause of every will and trust we draft.

I am married to MARY DOE, who is referred to as "my wife" in this Will. My wife and I are both citizens of the United States. My wife has been previously married and has two children from that marriage, CHILD 1 and CHILD 2, whom I have not adopted. References to "my wife's children" mean only her children named above. I have been previously married and have two children from that marriage, ADULT CHILD #1 and ADULT CHILD #2. References to "my children" mean only my children named above, as well as any other children of mine born or adopted after the execution of this Will; references to "my descendants" mean my children and their descendants.

If Frank Sr's will had had this kind of clause, tailored to reflect his exact wishes, this litigation could have probably been avoided.

Will and trust construction disputes are one of the most common forms of estate litigation, and - not surprisingly - a recurring theme on this blog. If you unpack the 5th DCA's opinion, you get a good example of how to argue a will-construction case. It's a convincing mix of law and logic, and certainly worth holding on to for the next time you find yourself litigating a similar case.

[1] 5th DCA: When in doubt, technical terms must be used in accordance with their legal definitions.

In this case, Frank Sr's will did NOT redefine the word "descendants". Ergo: you have to apply the statutory definition (which includes adoptees, but excludes step-children).

[2] 5th DCA: When in doubt, terms should be used consistently within the same document.

In this case the word "descendants" was used 3 times in Frank Sr's will. Once in the clause being litigated, then an additional 2 times in unrelated clauses. In the 2 uncontested clauses, the word descendants was used in accordance with its legal definition. Ergo: the legal definition of descendants should also apply to the contested clause as well.

[3] 5th DCA: Documents should be read in their entirety. When in doubt, terms should be used in a way that conforms with the rest of the estate plan.

In this case the 5th DCA noted: "[T]here is no language elsewhere in the will reflecting an intent on the part of Frank Sr. to grant Myrtle the power to disinherit his children in favor of her own children." Ergo: the word descendants should NOT be construed in a way that disinherits Frank Sr's children.

Florida Supreme Court says NO to charging-order protection for single member LLCs

Olmstead v. F.T.C., --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 2518106 (Fla. Jun 24, 2010)

Limited liability companies or "LLCs" have long been touted as the ultimate entity for investors and business owners alike: combining the best asset protection qualities and tax benefits of corporations and partnerships into a single hybrid entity. One of the big asset-protection selling points for LLCs is that they're entitled to the same "charging order" creditor protection partnerships are entitled to.

This Florida Supreme Court case involved a $10 million judgment obtained by the FTC against the debtors for having "operated an advance-fee credit card scam." Assets of these debtors were frozen and placed in receivership. Among the assets placed in receivership were several single-member LLCs. To partially satisfy its judgment the FTC obtained an order compelling the debtors to endorse and surrender to the receiver 100% of their right, title, and interest in their LLCs.

The debtors cried foul, arguing that the most the FTC was entitled to under Florida's LLC Act was a charging order against their single-member LLCs. The case was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which in turn asked the Florida Supreme Court to rule on the charging-order issue. In what is sure to be a controversial opinion, the Florida Supreme Court ruled charging-order protection does NOT apply to single-member LLCs. Here's a key excerpt explaining the court's thinking:

Since the charging order remedy clearly does not authorize the transfer to a judgment creditor of all an LLC member's “right, title and interest” in an LLC, while section 56.061 clearly does authorize such a transfer, the answer to the question at issue in this case turns on whether the charging order provision in section 608.433(4) always displaces the remedy available under section 56.061. Specifically, we must decide whether section 608.433(4) establishes the exclusive judgment creditor's remedy-and thus displaces section 56.061-with respect to a judgment debtor's ownership interest in a single-member LLC.

As a preliminary matter, we recognize the uncontested point that the sole member in a single-member LLC may freely transfer the owner's entire interest in the LLC. This is accomplished through a simple assignment of the sole member's membership interest to the transferee. Since such an interest is freely and fully alienable by its owner, section 56.061 authorizes a judgment creditor with a judgment for an amount equaling or exceeding the value of the membership interest to levy on that interest and to obtain full title to it, including all the rights of membership-that is, unless the operation of section 56.061 has been limited by section 608.433(4).

Section 608.433 deals with the right of assignees or transferees to become members of an LLC. Section 608.433(1) states the basic rule that absent a contrary provision in the articles or operating agreement, “an assignee of a limited liability company interest may become a member only if all members other than the member assigning the interest consent.” See also § 608.432(1)(a), Fla. Stat (2008). The provision in section 608.433(4) with respect to charging orders must be understood in the context of this basic rule.

The limitation on assignee rights in section 608.433(1) has no application to the transfer of rights in a single-member LLC. In such an entity, the set of “all members other than the member assigning the interest” is empty. Accordingly, an assignee of the membership interest of the sole member in a single-member LLC becomes a member-and takes the full right, title, and interest of the transferor-without the consent of anyone other than the transferor.

Section 608.433(4) recognizes the application of the rule regarding assignee rights stated in section 608.433(1) in the context of creditor rights. It provides a special means-i.e., a charging order-for a creditor to seek satisfaction when a debtor's membership interest is not freely transferable but is subject to the right of other LLC members to object to a transferee becoming a member and exercising the management rights attendant to membership status. See § 608.432(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (setting forth general rule that an assignee “shall have no right to participate in the management of the business affairs of [an LLC]”).

Section 608.433(4)'s provision that a “judgment creditor has only the rights of an assignee of [an LLC] interest” simply acknowledges that a judgment creditor cannot defeat the rights of nondebtor members of an LLC to withhold consent to the transfer of management rights. The provision does not, however, support an interpretation which gives a judgment creditor of the sole owner of an LLC less extensive rights than the rights that are freely assignable by the judgment debtor. See In re Albright, 291 B.R. 538, 540 (D.Colo.2003) (rejecting argument that bankruptcy trustee was only entitled to a charging order with respect to debtor's ownership interest in single-member LLC and holding that “[b]ecause there are no other members in the LLC, the entire membership interest passed to the bankruptcy estate”); In re Modanlo, 412 B.R. 715, 727-31 (D.Md.2006) (following reasoning of Albright).

Our understanding of section 608.433(4) flows from the language of the subsection which limits the rights of a judgment creditor to the rights of an assignee but which does not expressly establish the charging order remedy as an exclusive remedy. The relevant question is not whether the purpose of the charging order provision-i.e., to authorize a special remedy designed to reach no further than the rights of the nondebtor members of the LLC will permit-provides a basis for implying an exception from the operation of that provision for single-member LLCs. Instead, the question is whether it is justified to infer that the LLC charging order mechanism is an exclusive remedy.

On its face, the charging order provision establishes a nonexclusive remedial mechanism. There is no express provision in the statutory text providing that the charging order remedy is the only remedy that can be utilized with respect to a judgment debtor's membership interest in an LLC. The operative language of section 608.433(4)-”the court may charge the [LLC] membership interest of the member with payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest”-does not in any way suggest that the charging order is an exclusive remedy.

Did the Florida Supreme Court get this one right?

According to the dissent's lengthy opinion, they didn't. The dissent focused on a strict construction of Florida's LLC Act. However, if you step back and think about why partnerships are entitled to charging order protection in the first place, you have to admit the rationale doesn't seem to apply to single-member LLCs. Although this policy argument isn't explicitly stated in the Florida Supreme Court's majority opinion, I think it goes a long way towards explaining why they ruled the way they did.

For those of you interested in understanding the charging-order policy issue I think is lurking in the background of the Florida Supreme Court's ruling, STARTrightLLC.com is an excellent starting point. Below is an excerpt from that website explaining why charging-order protection makes sense in a multi-member LLC scenario, and why it doesn't make sense for single-member LLCs.

The charging order protects the company and the member’s investment if one of the members is sued in his or her personal life. . . . The original charging order philosophy protected guys A, B from having to accept D as an unwanted partner if C, the person they originally went into business with gets sued. They don’t want to have to deal with D. To prevent this unwanted member . . . the charging order is all D can get out of C’s membership . . . The charging order limits D. He must wait for A and B to decide to distribute money. No distributions = no money.

The Single Member Hitch: When a the member of a single member LLC is sued, there is no other member to protect from D. Two bankruptcy courts have used this flaw in the LLC protection to allow creditors of a business owner to completely take over his LLC and liquidate it for cash. The first case was in Colorado and the nation held its breath to see what would happen next. The next case was in Idaho and actually used the Colorado case to base its decision on. This means the trend is starting to move in the direction of denying charging order protection to single member LLCs.

3d DCA on when questioning from the bench goes too far in guardianship trials

Fernandez v. Guardianship of Fernandez, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 2178831 (Fla. 3d DCA Jun 02, 2010)

Contested guardianship proceedings are bench trials, which means the same person is both your fact finder and lawgiver: the judge. As explained in When the Judge Is the Jury, there are real advantages to bench trials:

“And one of the biggest advantages over the traditional courtroom is that the lawyers get to ‘read the jury’ all through the case. And since the judge can—and often will—ask questions, you’re always aware of what’s on the jury’s mind,” said Standwell."

I think most practicing lawyers have mixed feelings about questions from the bench. When the questions make clear the judge is leaning your way, you love 'em! When the opposite is true, you know it's going to be a bad day. Love 'em or hate 'em, questions from the bench are a fact of life and explicitly authorized under F.S. 90.615.

But when does questioning from the bench go too far? The answer to that question depends in large part on the facts and circumstances of your particular case, so hard and fast rules are difficult to come by. But most of us know it when we see it . . . and so does the 3d DCA. Here are the facts the appellate court was confronted with in the linked-to contested guardianship case:

[The trial court] decided that the hearing would proceed more expeditiously if the trial court conducted the examination of witnesses instead of allowing counsel to do so. The trial court swore the witnesses and denied the daughter's request to invoke the rule of exclusion of witnesses. The court called and questioned the witnesses, affording almost no opportunity for examination or cross-examination by the parties. There were no opening or closing statements.

According to the 3d DCA, this was too much. Questioning from the bench is proper, but if it's done to the exclusion of everyone else in the room, the parties aren't getting their fair day in court. Here's how the 3d DCA put it:

Respectfully, this was not proper procedure. The Florida Probate Rules provide that in adversary proceedings, “the proceedings, as nearly as practicable, shall be conducted similar to suits of a civil nature and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern....” Fla. Prob. R. 5.025(d)(2). See generally In re Guardianship of King, 862 So.2d 869, 870-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); The Florida Bar, Litigation Under Florida Probate Code § 1.6 (7th ed.2009); 28 Fla. Jur.2d Guardian and Ward, § 35 (updated Feb. 2010). “The adjudicatory hearing must be conducted at the time and place specified in the notice of hearing and in a manner consistent with due process.” § 744.331(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008).

As this was an evidentiary hearing in a contested proceeding, the matter should have been tried as is customary in a bench trial. The parties should have been given an opportunity to make opening and closing statements. Each party should have been given an opportunity to present evidence, call and question witnesses, and cross-examine the other side's witnesses. When the guardian ad litem gave her report, cross-examination by the parties should have been allowed.

At the start of the hearing, the daughter invoked the rule of exclusion of witnesses [under F.S. 90.616]. The trial court denied that request. The request should have been granted.

Lessons learned?

First: contested guardianship proceedings are treated like any other kind of bench trial under Florida law, and need to be adjudicated accordingly. The parties are entitled to all of the due-process rights any litigant is entitled to in a Florida court room, including at a bare minimum:

  1. The opportunity to make opening and closing statements.
  2. The opportunity to present evidence, call and question witnesses, and cross-examine the other side's witnesses.
  3. The opportunity to cross examine the guardian ad litem.
  4. The exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom in accordance with F.S. 90.616.

Second: lawyers on the wrong end of an overactive judge have to object. To put it mildly, this kind of objection needs to be handled "delicately." So what's a lawyer to do? The Winter 2009 edition of the ABA's Litigation magazine has an excellent article by Houston, Texas litigator Martin J. Siegel that speaks directly to this question. Entitled When Judges Want to Get in the Game: Lessons from Another Court, Mr. Siegel's article is thoughtful, well written, and well researched. Here's an excerpt:

“[L]awyers on the wrong end of the overactive judge have to object. As with questions from opposing counsel, failure to object to improper examination from the bench will waive the error. Ditto with remarks to the jury. On appeal, if no objection was made, review will be for plain error, and only those errors resulting in an unfair trial will merit reversal. Courts recognize that objecting to the judge’s questions and comments can be touchy and difficult, but still require counsel to give it a go. If the judge wishes to examine witnesses at any length, there is precedent for seeking a sidebar out of the hearing of the jury or a recess and asking the court to inform counsel of the desired line of questioning so that the examination will come from the lawyers and not carry the imprimatur of the court.

To the extent possible, lawyers should also make sure the objectionable conduct is fully on the record, even the little things that will add flavor to the appeal but may not always come through on the cold page, like the judge’s demeanor, tone, or volume. For example, in one case, the judge’s repeated pointing to the defendant’s lawyer in an effort to prompt him to object made it into the record because the plaintiff’s lawyer, finally exasperated with the court’s unusual theatrics, said, ‘Your Honor, I haven’t even finished my question, and you’re pointing to the defense counsel to object to my question.’ Nationwide Mutual, 174 F.3d at 808.”

2d DCA says NO to class-action creditor claims under Florida's Probate Code

Baillargeon v. Sewell, --- So.3d ----, 2010 WL 1727842 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr 30, 2010)

As a probate lawyer, you're often the low man on the totem pole in cases involving large, complex matters. The firm representing the estate on the civil litigation side of the case could be (and often is) a large firm with hundreds of lawyers on the payroll, staffing your particular matter with a team of high-powered litigators. And then there's the probate lawyer. Often a sole or small-firm practitioner, usually working the case alone or (at most), with the help of a single associate and a paralegal.

David vs. Goliath

This case is a prime example of the disproportionate impact a good probate lawyer can have on the course of events. The estate was on the receiving end of a $150 million class action claim. I have no idea how much cost and delay is involved in defending against this type of claim in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida (which is where it was being litigated), but I'm sure it's huge. Undaunted, an alert probate lawyer spotted an opportunity to save the estate hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal defense fees by ending the case immediately in the probate court. Here's how he did it:

[1] Does Florida's Probate Code permit the filing of class action claims against a decedent's estate? 2d DCA says NO

Two creditors of the decedent filed a statement of claim in an estate administration proceeding on behalf of themselves and a class of persons similarly situated. The personal representative of the estate moved to strike the claim to the extent that it attempted to assert claims on behalf of persons other than the claimants. The probate judge disagreed, and let the class-action portion of the claim stand. On appeal the 2d DCA disagreed, ruling that Florida's Probate Code does NOT permit the filing of class action claims against a decedent's estate. Here's why:

In [In re Estate of Gay, 294 So.2d 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)], the Fourth District held that the filing of a class claim was inconsistent with the requirements of section 733.16, Florida Statutes (1971). Id. at 670. Section 733.16 appeared in the former Florida Probate Law. The Fourth District also said that the filing of a class claim was in conflict with the public policy of this state favoring the speedy administration of decedents' estates. Id.

*     *     *     *     *

Despite the Code's comprehensive coverage of the administration of decedents' estates in general and creditors' claims in particular, it is silent on the subject of class claims. As we have already noted, the Fourth District's decision in Gay is the only reported authority in Florida on the subject of the filing of class claims in probate. The Gay case was decided under the Florida Probate Law in 1974, more than thirty-five years ago. Thus it is pertinent to note “that the legislature is presumed to know the judicial constructions of a law when enacting a new version of that law.” Brannon v. Tampa Tribune, 711 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (citing Collins Inv. Co. v. Metro. Dade County, 164 So.2d 806 (Fla.1964)). “Furthermore, the legislature is presumed to have adopted prior judicial constructions of a law unless a contrary intention is expressed in the new version.” Id. (citing Deltona Corp. v. Kipnis, 194 So.2d 295 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)). Thus, in the absence of any reference to the filing of class claims in the Code either when it was enacted or in the multiple subsequent amendments to it, the legislature must be presumed to have adopted the Fourth District's holding in Gay that class claims may not be filed in probate. Accordingly, we conclude that any change in the probate claims process to allow the filing of class claims must come from the legislature instead of through a judicial construction of the Code by this court that would be at odds with the Fourth District's holding in Gay.

[2] If a lawsuit is pending against the decedent when he died, do you still need to file a separate creditor claim against his estate? 2d DCA says YES

When the decedent died, he was one of several defendants named in a class action that was then pending in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Randolph Sewell and Daphne Sewell (the Sewells) had filed the class action on May 30, 2007, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against a number of entities and individuals, including the decedent. After letters of administration were issued to the personal representative, she was promptly substituted as a party defendant in the pending action. The Sewells then filed a first amended class action complaint specifically naming the personal representative as a defendant.

On these facts the probate judge ruled that the filing of the claim was unnecessary because a federal action asserting the class claim was pending against the decedent at the time of his death and because the personal representative of the estate was promptly substituted as a party defendant in the federal action.

Strike two for the probate judge. On appeal the 2d DCA reversed him on this issue as well, holding that the probate judge's ruling was based on old case law that no longer applied.

The circuit court's rationale for accepting the Sewells' argument that it was unnecessary to file a claim on behalf of the unidentified members of the class was as follows: “[T]he estate had notice ... the action was pending when the [Decedent] died and the [Personal Representative] has been joined in the federal class [action].” However, the circuit court's reliance on the decision in [In re Estate of Shaw, 340 So.2d 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976),] for this proposition was misplaced. In the Shaw case, the result was controlled by the former Florida Probate Law's section 733.16, the predecessor to current section 733.702.

*     *     *     *     *

[T]he exception for actions pending at the death of the decedent is no longer in effect, and Shaw and similar cases that applied the exception in section 733.16(1)(a) are no longer authoritative on this question. See Spohr v. Berryman, 589 So.2d 225, 228-29 (Fla.1991); Roberts v. Jassy, 436 So.2d 394, 395-96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Dimson, 645 So.2d 45, 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Lasater v. Leathers, 475 So.2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

It follows that the filing of a claim on behalf of the unidentified members of the class was not made unnecessary by the pendency of the class action at the death of the decedent and the prompt substitution of the personal representative in the pending federal action. The circuit court erred in ruling to the contrary.